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Chicago, January 21 1 1970 ~~ Folaowing is the text of an L 
I 
address made Tuesday, Januar_y 20 to the Chicago Cou11~il on 
Foreign Affairs by U,S, Under Secretary of_ State, Elliot Richards_ono 
I would like today to examine one of the most fundamental 
our foreign policy 'concerns, and one which in some ways is too 
much taken for granted, if not overlooked -- the United States 
relationship to Western Europe and Western European security. 
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In a reverse twist on the early days of the Republic when 
George Washington used to preach against yielding to "the insidous 
wiles" of Europe's influence, our basic ties to Western Europe 
are now so firmly established that commentary on the subject is 
regarded as a tiresome reaffirmation of the obviouso 
Whereas President Washington·warned that European controversies 
were "essentially foreign to our concerns" President Nixon was 
moved to observe on NATO's birthday last spring that many people 
now find NATO "quaint and familiar and a bit old fashioned." 
To much·or the public the purposes of NATO have the character 
of a clicheo The very climate of security which NATO has fostered \ 
has, perv~rsely, seemed to permit many to disregard it or to think 
j it obsolete, In the wake of the re~examination of foreign commit-
ments occasioned by the Vietnam war, there is a tendency by some to 
say that NATO has done its job, so why not bring those troops home? 
In the U o s. Senate this feeling has taken concrete political 
expression in the form of a resolution introduced by Senator Mansfield 11 
one of the most thoughtful students of America's role in world affairs. 
His resolution calls for "substantial reductfons" or u~so forces 
in Europeo 
Meanwhile, Western Europe itself, prosperous, mostly 
democratic, stable, and probably more secu~e than at any time in its 
modern history, has been preoccupied~th the inevitable problems that 
are the by=product of affluence and rapid economic growth. These 
concerniseem to have caused it to drift somewhat from the lofty ~ 
goals of a unified Europe and Atlantic partnership which gave a sense 
of mission to its leadership two decades ago. 
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On both sides of the Atlantic theng there are feelings 
of complacency and a restless anticipation of new eventso The 
memory of Czechoslovakia is fading, the Brezhnev doctrine is ~ 
dimmer, and a reduced sense of danger merges with the feeling that 
new initiatives are both called for and inevitableo Perhaps in 
response to this atmosphere the Warsaw Pact nations, led by the 
Soviet Union, have called for the convocation of_A European 
security conference, although -- ironically -- their suggested 
agenda would not even touch the basie issues of European securityo 
In this situation, it is, I think, worthwhile to take a fresh 
look at the suppositions on which our European policy rests, to 
examine its continuing validity, and to appraise frankly and 
realistically the proposals being made for change and adjustment~ 
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Two world wars have led the American people to perceive with 
great clarity that the security of the United Sta tea is directly 
linked to the security of Western Europeo 
Pursuant to this belief, which was formalized in the North 
Atlantic Treaty of 1949 1 the United States has maintained a 
major military establishment on European·soil since the early 1950°so 
UoSo nuclear power as well as conventional forces are available in 
support of this tPeaty commitmento Although Europe is now 
incomparably stronger than it was when this arrangement was first 
contracted, its ultimate security, like our own, continues to be 
linked to our power and nuclear deterrenceo Because of this, one 
of President Nixon's first acts upon taking office was to reaffirm 
the American commitment to NATO and to promise close and continuing 
consultation within the Allianceo 
Deterrence is a subtle concepto Its reality takes form 
largely in the minds of those who.might be contemplating aggressiono 
It is effective only when they conclude that any possible 
advantages of aggresfion would be offset by its predictable costso 
NAT0 9 s strategy:of flexible response is calculated to insure 
that any potential aggressor would come to just this conclusiono 
Our conventional forces are maintained in position in Europe 
to resist possible attacks by Warsaw Pact formationso They are 
meant also to deter piecemeal aggression which an enemy might 
be tempted to conclude he could··get away with if the only alternative 
to our capitulation were the unleashing of nuclear waro These 
forces are supported,by a broad arsenal of·~actical nuclear weapons, 
available for use if the intensity of the aggression riseso · 
The entire effectiveness of the flexible response strategy 
rests perforce on the conviction in both parts of Europe that 
·the United States will fulfill its determined roleo And the 
United States military presence in Europe, whether we like it or 
not, continues to be taken as tangible evidence of our commitmento 
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We must face the fact, therefore, that any sudden or dramatic 
reduction in the United States1n111tary presence in Europe would 
have unpleasant consequences of two kindso 
-First, as a practical military matter, NATO's conventional 
defense would be significantly weaken~de Other NATO members might 
be tempted to follow suit and cut forces furthere In the event of 
aggression, a less powerful NATO Alliance might be driven to resort 
more quickly to nuclear weaponso 
~Secondly, and of probably greater consequence, any sudden or 
~or withdrawal of American forces would have a distinctly 
destabilizing effect on the European sceneo 
The structure of the Alliance, as indeed the entire st~ture 
of world order which we have helped ·erect since the war, rests in 
the final analysis on the shared confidence that we shall honor 
our commitmentso 
If that confidence is eroded a rapid deterioration can occur 
a deterioration not unlike that which can send prices on the stock 
market plummetingo And for this reason it is doubly necessary that 
we not lightly or hastily make moves that might undermine confid.ehca 
in the strength of our supporto It is for this reason that we have 
pledged our present troop strength in Europe through fiscal year 
197lo 
Let me stress that none of this suggests that UoSo troops will 
have to remain in Europe at present strength forever and evero 
Certainly we hope that future conditions will allow modification~ 
of our roleo Our current force level in Europe of 310 1 000 men 
already, in fact, represents a considerable drop from the peak of 
408 1 000 in 1962 during the Soviet war of nerves on Berlino We are 
also continually studying and trying to improve the means by which 
troops stationed in the United States can be rapidly returned to 
Europe in/case of crisiso The Mansfield resolution urgers1 that 
greater use be made of this redeployment optiono 
Our studies shc"J however, that under present conditions front-
line forces hastily returned to Europe in time of crisis could 
not carry out their mission with the same effectiveness as forces 
already in placeo Although rapid redeployment of li~ited forces is 
feasible, large~scale efforts of this sort expose these forces 
to hazards and potential confusiono 
Moreover, financial savings WQ.Uld be negligibleo If, for 
example, all of our current forces in Europe were brought home and 
stationed in this country 1 little or. no savings would appear in .our defense budgeto We might even have to spend a bit more, because 
we would lose significant financial advantageso 
In Germany, the Fede~al Government makes land, housing, 
facilities and services available to our forces at no cost, or at 
reduced costo Duplicating such facilities and support in the United 
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States would involve a heavy and continuing expense -~ one roughly 
cancelling out savings in shortened supply lines and transportation 
costs to Europeo • 
The balance-of~payments drain of our military deployment in 
Europe is currently.about $lo5 billiona.yearo This is unquestionably 
a large figure, and, if our forces~re returned to this country, many 
of those dollars would stay at borneo The problem is particularly 
neutralized, however~ by offset- arrangements with the European 
countries, particularly Germany and we are exploring means of making 
these arrangements more adequateo In addition, withdrawal of our 
forces from Europe would be likely to evoke prompt countervailing 
effects, notably in reduced sale of military equipment to our 
allies and in general exports to those countrieso 
. CONSULTATIONS WITH OUR ALLIES 
If we have not neglected the consideration of means by which 
our presence in Europe could be streamlined or modified without 
damaging the essential structure of the alliance, neither have we 
ignoredthe opportunities which the era of negotiation we have now 
entered may hold for the futureo In this area we must also make 
meticulous and balanced Judgments, taking care not to allow our 
efforts to bring about agreements with the Soviet Union to under-
mine our relations with our friends in Western Europeo 
We must have a proper regard for the always latent fear that 
agreements will be reached detrimental to European interestso 
We cannot, of course, allow the existence of this fear to deter us 
from seeking to lower tensionso Ironically, in fact, there exists 
among a younger generation of Europeans the converse suspicion that 
the United States and the USSR are collaborators in defense of the 
status quoo But we intend to do everything possible to ally 
such fears and suspicions by sticking strictly to our pledge to 
consult closely with our allies and tak.e their fnterests into 
account as talks go forwardo Only by sucll close'consultation can 
we quiet the Cassandras who see every effort at US-Soviet 
rapprochement or even minor moves to adjust force levels as 
evidence of betrayalo 
During the past year in-depth consultations have been held 
on a wide range of subjects, including the question of strategic. 
arms limitationso The deputy foreign ministers of the NATO 
governments, at President Nixon 9 s suggestion, held the first of 
what we expect to be periodic reviews of major, long-range problems 
before the Allianceo 
It is particularly important that there be the fullest 
consultations on the SALT talkso The very fact that these talks are 
going on has stimulated some uneasiness in Europeo It is well 
unders~ood that the talks imply changing strategic relationships 
and that their success could further affect the situationo As 
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as President Nixon put it last Sll"ping: "The West does not have 
the massive nuclear predominance today that it once had, and any 
sort of broad~based arms agreement with the Soviet would cofidy 
the -present balance." 
Given the European sensitivities on SALT and nervousness 
about changing military relationships, it would seem wise not 
to compou~danxieties at this time by any moves to reduce our 
troop sttength on the continento 
While attempting to keep our allies abreast of our own 
negotiating activities, we are welcoming and encouraging their 
own efforts, particularly those of West Germany, to improve 
relations with ~he~Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern 
Europe. One of the most promising areas of potential progress 
with the Eastern European nations lies, we believe, in reaching 
agreement on mutual and balanced East-West force reductions. 
We are now working with our allies to develop models which 
could form the basis for such an agreemento The NATO countries 
foreign ministers, meeting last December, said in their decla-
ration that despite the fact that there had been no response on 
earlier suggestions, the allies "will continue their studies in 
order to prepare a realistic basis for active exploration at an 
early dateo" They concluded their studies on the subject had 
already progressed sufficiently to permit ,the establishment of 
criteria which reductions should meeto They directed their 
further consideration'also go forward on related measures such 
as advance notification of military movements or maneuv~rs, 
the exchange of observers at maneuvers, and the establishment 
of observation postso This, we are convinced is a constructive 
approach much more specifically directed at concrete issue 
generating tension than the Warsaw Pact's vague proposal for a 
·European security conferenceo 
We hope the Warsaw Pact nations will respondo Realism, 
however, suggests that they will be less likely to respond 
if a unilateral reduction of U o So forces appears in the 
offing anywayo The firm belief that it would weaken our bar-
gaining position on balanced force reduction is thus another 
reason why the Administration opposes the Mansfield resolution. 
Among the questions raised by those who favor an 
immediate and substantial reduction of our forces in Europe 
is whether the burden of NATO defense is now fairly allocatedo 
The pro~perous Europeans should, they feel, carry a much 
larger share of the defense of their own continento 
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We agree up to one point. The United States believe that 
our European allies can and should do more. We have told them 
often that if they increase their own efforts, it would help 
ua to maintain ours. So even though they actually have in-
creased their defense budgets to cover improvements in their 
forces, while our own defense budget has been declining, we 
have and are continuing to press them to assume a larger 
share of Europe's defense responsibilities. 
A precipitate reduction of United States forces in Europe 
would, however, not only fail to stimulate additional European 
effort, it would probably produce the contrary effect. The 
bulk of any substantial reductions in U.S. forces would have 
to be made up by West Germany, the most ·populous and wealthiest 
of our NATO allies. But the German people do not relish an 
enlargement of their country's military establishment. Nor 
certainly does a Soviet Union still highly emotional about its 
20 million World War II dead and enormously sensitive On the 
subject of German ''revanchism". Indeed, it would give pause 
even to some of Germany's allies. 
Any significant rise in the German defensive effort 
could thus destroy Chancellor Brandt's constructive efforts 
to improve relationships with the Federal Republic's Eastern 
neighbors and thereby halt the attempts to lay the foundation 
for a settlement of the issues still dividing Europe. 
I spoke earlier of the fact that we did not want to 
suggest that the present number of U.S. troops in Europe was 
inviolate and could or would never be changed. We hope that 
conditions will eventually come about which will render their 
presence altogether unnecessary.But when such conditions do 
come, I feel certain they will be the result of hard and. 
patient bargaining. 
Back in 19ij8, when the cold war was very cold indeed, 
Belgian Foreign Minister Paul Henri Spaak, addressing himself 
to the Soviet's Andre Vyshinsky at a UN Secretary Council 
session, said: " The basis of our policy today in Europe is 
fear. We are afraid of you. We are afraid of your government 
and we are afraid of the polici~s which you are pursuing". 
Twenty-two years later tensions are lower and East and 
West are engaged in substantive discussions aimed at lowering 
them further. But the basic cement holding together the 
alliance is still the threat from the East. The United 
States does not control the alliance. When France chose to 
withdraw from NATO we could not prevent it from doing so. 
Unlike the Warsaw Pact which rests on an ideological base 
guarded and sanctified by the Soviet Union, NATO has no 
dogmatic underpinnings, There is no Western version of the 
... 
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Brezhnev doctrineo When there is no more threat to the 
security of the nations of Western Europe, there will be no 
more need for NATO. And only when the confrontation in Europe 
truly ends and a genuine peace replaces the always precarious 
peace of mutual deterrence will the role of our troops be 
finally accomplished. 
On another front, in response to the President's initiative~ 
the alliance has taken on a new dimension by creating a pema-
nent committee on the challenges of modern society to help 
deal constructively with some of the most pressing problems 
common to all its members -- the problems of the environment. 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
The United States, meanwhile, continues to support the 
goal of a politically and economically integrated Europe. 
Despite the recent signs of drift, eeonomic integration has 
come far, and there are indications that new moves forward 
may be developing. The most ambitious of the European 
regional arrangements -- the European Community of the Six 
has already gone beyond the earlier conception of inter-
national cooperation to a new form of relationship among 
nation states. 
Since the EEC was established in 1958 its members have 
abolished tariffs among themselves, agreed upon important 
measures of the harmonizatio.n, _instituted an ambitious common 
agricultural policy and removed most barriers to the free 
movement of capital and labor. As a group the Six have 
enjoyed significantly higher rates of economic activity, 
trade and growth than before 1958. Inter--Community trade has 
almost quadrupled. Since 1967 Community trade with the out-
side world has exceeded that of the United States. 
The recent Summit Conference of the Six at The.Hague 
and the success of the Council of Ministers of the Community 
in agreeing on a far-reaching plan for financing their common 
agricultural policy preface moves to perfect the economic 
union and extend it to new members in the next year or two. 
On the latter point, the interests of the United States are 
very much engaged, not only economically but militarily, for 
~nlargement of the European Communities to admit countries not 
committed to the defense of the West raises questions about 
the possibilities of political unity anq the underlying 
strength of the NATO alliance itself. 
The United States sees no conflict between the goal of 
European integration and the efforts now going forward to end 
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the dangerous and increasingly anachronistic division of the 
continent. We welcome the indication that dissatisfaction 
over the continuing gulf between the two halves of Europe is 
growing in·the East as well. Stronger relationships in 
Western Europe itself can, we believe, facilitate the building 
of stronger relationships with the East. 
"I believe we must build an alliance," the President 
has said, "strong enough to deter those who would threaten 
war; close enough to provide for continuous and far-reaching 
consultation; trusting enough to accept a diversity of views; 
realistic enough to deal with·the world as it is; flexible 
enough to explore new channels of constructive cooperation." 
In the past year, I believe, we have strengthened the 
alliance on each of these counts. Strength, closeness, 
trust, realism, flexibility ~-·these will be useful assets 
as we move toward the new hopes and new possibilities of 
the "era of negotiation." 
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